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Real Property
by T. Daniel Brannan*
Stephen M. LaMastra**
and
William J. Sheppard
This Article surveys case law and legislative developments in the
Georgia law of real property for the period June 1, 1994, to May 31,
1995. The authors do not endeavor in this Article to comment upon
every case or statute that touches on the law relating to real property.
Instead, this Article is intended to provide practitioners with a
convenient guide which focuses on developments of some significance,
either by virtue of clarification of the law in a confused area or by its
substantial effect on the practice generally.
I. LAND LINES AND BOUNDARIES
The appeal in Purcell v. C. Goldstein & Sons, Inc.,' arose out of a
long-standing dispute between the parties concerning the correct line
dividing their respective properties.' Goldstein & Sons, Inc. ("Goldstein") and Purcell own adjacent parcels of real property in Baldwin
County.3 The civil action, which is the subject of the current appeal,
* Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia
State University (A.B., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of

Georgia.
** Vice President and General Counsel, Wolf Camera, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia. Formerly

with Alston & Byrd, Atlanta, Georgia. Wake Forest University (B.A., 1987); Vanderbilt
University (J.D., 1990). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia.

Emory University (B.A., 1986); Mercer University (J.D., 1992). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. 264 Ga. 443, 448 S.E.2d 174 (1994).
2. Id. at 443, 448 S.E.2d at 174. Incredibly, the dispute between the parties in this

case dates back to at least March 1981. See Purcell v. C.Goldstein & Sons, Inc., 166 Ga.
App. 547, 548, 305 S.E.2d 10, 12-13 (1983) (stating that a processioning proceeding was
held in the Probate Court of Baldwin County in early 1981).
3. 264 Ga. at 443, 448 S.E.2d at 174 (case tried in Baldwin County Superior Court).
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began when Goldstein filed an action "seeking establishment of the
correct property line, a declaration that [Purcell's] house encroached on
[Goldstein's] property, and an injunction against [Purcell's] continued
encroachment on [Goldstein's] property."4 After a full trial, the jury
found in favor of Goldstein with regard to the location of the property
line and found that Purcell's house encroached on Goldstein's property.
However, the jury also requested that Purcell be permitted to keep his
house where it was. The trial court entered a judgment based on the
jury's verdict, which included a statement that Purcell was permitted "to
keep the house where it was as a 'permissive encroachment."'5
Purcell appealed the trial court's decision, asserting two enumerations
of error. First, he argued that the court improperly admitted evidence
without which there would have been no support for the judgment.
Specifically, Purcell argued that a plat prepared by Goldstein's surveyor
was inadmissible because it failed to meet the technical requirements of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 15-6-67. 6
The court rejected the argument and found that the requirements
contained in O.C.G.A. section 15-6-67 related only to the recordation of
plats and not to their admissibility as evidence in court proceedings. 7
The court found that a plat's failure to meet the requirements for
recordation had no effect on the admission of the plat for purposes of
illustrating "other competent testimony regarding the boundar[ies]"
shown on that plat; it simply means that the plat is not "presumptive
evidence" of its contents.8
Purcell also argued that the trial court's judgment conflicted with the
intent of the jury's verdict because the "injunction as worded will not
permit [Purcell] to go onto [Goldstein's] property to maintain the portion
of the structure which encroaches on [Goldstein's] property." Purcell
argued that an easement allowing him to maintain his house was
implied in the jury's verdict.9 The court rejected that argument and
concluded that the jury did not grant Purcell an easement, but had
granted him only an indulgence "notwithstanding his illegal encroachment on [Goldstein's] property."'0

4. Id.
5. Id,
6. Id. at 444, 448 S.E.2d at 175. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-67 sets forth the specifications for
maps and plats that are recorded in official land records in Georgia. The size of the maps
and plats, the size of the typeface on them, the requirements for captions, and the data
that must be included are all contained in that Code section. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-67(b) (1994).
7. 264 Ga. at 444, 448 S.E.2d at 175.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 444-45, 448 S.E.2d at 175.
10. Id. at 445, 448 S.E.2d at 175.
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The Supreme Court's affirmation of the trial court's verdict in Purcell

is important because of the statement concerning the evidentiary effect
of a map or plat that is not drawn in proper form for recording. The
court's opinion indicates that evidence in the form of a properly drawn
and recorded plat creates an evidentiary presumption that the items
depicted on it are correct. Further, even a non-recordable plat is
relevant evidence that may be used to support other testimony concerning the land depicted in the plat.11
The dispute in Phelps v. Huff 2 revolved around the location of a
boundary line between two adjoining land lots. The boundary had been
drawn in two different locations by various surveyors. The two
properties at issue were originally part of a 275-acre farm owned by F.N.
Carter ("Carter"). In 1954, Carter divided the farm among his seven
children, with each child receiving one forty-acre Land Lot. Sarah
Stubbs received Land Lot 98 ("Lot 98"), and Endicott received Land Lot
97 ("Lot 97"), which adjoined Lot 98 to the west.1 3
In 1957, at the request of Endicott and Stubbs, Robinson surveyed
Lots 97 and 98. While present on the two properties to conduct his
survey, Robinson showed Endicott and Stubbs iron pins which he had set
indicating the corners and mid-point of the line forming the common
boundary between Lots 97 and 98. Robinson testified that both Endicott
and Stubbs agreed that the iron pins he set were placed along the true
boundary between their two properties.14 At various times over the
next thirty years, the boundary between Lots 97 and 98 was resurveyed,
and each time the boundary line was indicated as lying approximately
thirty-five to forty-five feet east of the boundary drawn by Robinson,
increasing the size of Lot 97 and decreasing the size of Lot 98.1
Endicott sold the portion of Lot 97 which adjoined Lot 98 to the plaintiffs
in this case; the Phelps, the Osbornes, and McElroy. Ms. Bill Huff is the
daughter of Stubbs and owns the portion of Lot 98 adjacent to Lot 97.16
The actual dispute over the exact location of the boundary between
Lots 97 and 98 began in 1988, when Huffs attorney wrote letters to the
Phelpses, the Osbornes, and McElroy claiming the line drawn by
Robinson was the correct boundary. Thereafter, Huff began preparations
to build a fence along the boundary as marked by the line drawn by
Robinson in 1957. Following a trial, the jury entered a verdict in favor

11. See id.

12. 214 Ga. App. 398, 448 S.E.2d 64 (1994).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 398, 448
at 399, 448
at 399-400,
at 400, 448

S.E.2d at 65.
S.E.2d at 65.
448 S.E.2d at 66.
S.E.2d at 66.
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of Huff, finding the17location of the boundary line as that originally
drawn by Robinson.
On appeal, plaintiffs challenged several evidentiary decisions reached
by the trial court and argued that a jury instruction given by the court
constituted reversible error. Plaintiffs' first argument involved a letter
written by Endicott in 1984 to a real estate agent in connection with
Endicott's attempt to sell portions of Land Lot 97.18 In that letter
Endicott referred to the survey performed by Robinson in 1957 and
stated that both she and Stubs "were present at the time of the survey
and we both agreed with Robinson as to the property lines and accepted
his survey as correct." 9 Both prior to trial and upon Huffs attempted
introduction of the letter at trial, plaintiffs objected on the basis that the
letter contained hearsay.20 The court of appeals noted that O.C.G.A.
section 24-3-13 allows the admission of "'[tiraditional evidence as to
ancient boundaries and landmarks.'"2 1 Therefore, the court of appeals
concluded that the letter was properly admitted.22
Plaintiffs also objected to the admission at trial of opinion testimony
from a land surveyor and real estate attorney. In response to direct
questioning by Huff, Tibbets, a registered surveyor, testified that a
surveyor has authority to establish a property line "'in the case of a new
parcel-creating a new parcel of land."'23 Plaintiffs did not object to
that testimony. In response to cross-examination questioning, Tibbets
again testified that a "surveyor could establish for a property owner '[in
the case of a subdivision or a property line agreement.'" 4 On redirect
examination, Huff asked Tibbets if Robinson established the "common
line between the adjoining,landowners" based on the facts that no prior
dividing line had been surveyed and that the property owners' acceptance of his survey was correct.2" Plaintiffs finally objected to that
question on the basis that it called for a legal opinion.'
The court of appeals noted that "'[w]here a party fails to object to
certain inadmissible evidence, but later objects to substantially the same
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 399, 448 S.E.2d at 66.
20. Id. at 400, 448 S.E.2d at 66. In their pretrial motion, plaintiffs also argued that
Endicott's letter violated former Ga. Code Ann. § 38-1603 (the "Deadman's statute").
However, that argument was not raised when the letter was introduced into evidence and
was not argued on appeal. 214 Ga. App. at 400, 448 S.E.2d at 66.
21. 214 Ga. App. at 401, 448 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 24-3-13 (1995)).
22. Id. at 400, 448 S.E.2d at 67.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 401-02, 448 S.E.2d at 67.
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evidence, the objection should be overruled because the failure to object
the first time makes this harmless error."'2 7 Based on that principal,
the court concluded that plaintiffs' failure to object to the prior
questioning on the same point waived any objection they might have had
with regard to the final statement by Tibbets.28 The court also stated
that Tibbets' opinion "was not a legal one but one of fact."29 The court
stated that Tibbets had testified from the viewpoint of an experienced
surveyor and testified based on his knowledge and practice of the
profession concerning the effect of an agreement between adjoining
property owners. The court indicated that such testimony was a proper
subject for expert opinion testimony.0
Plaintiffs also objected to testimony from Huff's attorney, Benson.
Huff asked Benson a hypothetical question, asking him to state his
opinion, as a lawyer, of the effect of the acquiescence of adjoining
landowners in accepting a survey of the boundaries of their properties
as correct.3 1 The court of appeals found that "Benson's opinion 'as a
lawyer' can only be interpreted as his opinion that this agreement would
establish the line as a matter of law."32 As noted by the court, that
determination was the responsibility of the jury.3" However, because
the court instructed the jury that they were to determine the location of
the property line under the legal theories of acquiescence or adverse
possession and instructed the jury that they were to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence, the appellate
court concluded that admission into evidence of Benson's opinion was
harmless error.34
Finally, plaintiffs argued that the trial court should not have given
Jury Charge Number 10 over their objection. The text of the jury charge
at issue is as follows:
[Wlhere the owners of adjoining property agree upon a line as dividing
their property and they acquiesce in that line either by acts or by
declarations, that line becomes the fixed boundary between the
properties; whether it is the original land line makes no difference.
The agreed upon line is the true line between them. Further, when an

27. Id. at 402,448 S.E.2d at 67 (quoting Steverson v. Hospital Auth., 129 Ga. App. 510,
514, 199 S.E.2d 881, 885 (1973)).
28. Id.
29. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 68.
30. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 67.
31. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 68.
32. Id. at 403, 448 S.E.2d at 68.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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oral agreement is made and executed it is binding upon all purchasers
of that land.3"
The court of appeals found that the instruction was adjusted to the
evidence and accurately stated the status of the law on the issues
discussed.3" Therefore, there was no error in giving that instruction to
the jury.3 7 Although the appeal in Phelps was decided mainly on
evidentiary grounds, the holding in that case is significant for the
concept embodied in the trial court's instruction to the jury.

II.

TITLE To LAND

Plaintiff in Hamil v. Stanford,8 Petrelia Hamil, and her husband
Louie Hamil were divorced in 1977. 39 At that time, the marital home
was titled in Mr. Hamil's name. The divorce decree required Mr. Hamil
to make monthly mortgage payments on the house while Ms. Hamil and
the couple's children were permitted to occupy the home. In the event
the home was put up for sale, Ms. Hamil had a first right of refusal and
was entitled to receive one-half of the profit derived the sale of the
home.40
In 1990, Mr. Hamil sold the home to his secretary, Fay Stanford, and
her husband.4 Ms. Hamil filed suit against Mr. Hamil and against the
Stanfords seeking to set aside the conveyance of the property. The
Stanfords filed a counterclaim seeking damages and attorney fees based
on Ms. Hamil's alleged interference with their right of enjoyment to the
property.4 2
At the close of Ms. Hamil's evidence presented at trial, the Stanfords
moved for entry of a directed verdict. In connection with that motion,
the trial court found that the house was sold for a reasonable price, that
there was no evidence that the Stanfords were aware of any restrictions
on the sale of the property, and that, in any event, the Stanfords owed
no duty to Ms. Hamil with regard to the property. Accordingly, the trial
court concluded that the Stanfords were bona fide purchasers for value

35. Id. at 404 n.3, 448 S.E.2d at 69 n.3.
36. Id. at 404, 448 S.E.2d at 69.
37. Id.
38. 264 Ga. 801, 449 S.E.2d 118 (1994).
39. Id. at 801, 449 S.E.2d at 119.
40. Id.
41. Id. The court's opinion noted that Mr. Hamil sold the property while Ms. Hamil
was "imprisoned." Id.
42. Id. The Stanfords' claim against Ms. Hamil was based on O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1, which
provides that "[t]he right of enjoyment of private property being an absolute right of every
citizen, every act of another which unlawfully interferes with such enjoyment is a tort for
which an action shall lie." O.C.G.A. § 51-9-1 (1982).
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and granted their motion.43 At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial
court found in favor of the Stanfords on their counterclaim and in favor
of Ms. Hamil against her ex-husband. Ms. Hamil appealed both the trial
court's entry of directed verdict against her on her claim against the
Stanfords and the order in favor of the Stanfords on their counterclaim.44
The supreme court stated, as a preliminary matter, that the verdict
entered after a bench trial would not be disturbed if there was any
evidence to support the findings.45 Next, the court analyzed the
testimony presented at trial and concluded that Mr. Hamil's and the
Stanfords' testimony supported the verdict." Accordingly, the court
affirmed entry of a directed verdict against Ms. Hamil on her claim
The court did, however, reverse the
against the Stanfords.4 7
judgment entered in favor of the Stanfords on their counterclaim.4 s
The appellate court found that there was "no evidence [Ms. Hamill ever
interfered with the Stanfords' possessory interest in the realty."49 In
the absence of such evidence, the trial court had no basis for concluding
that Ms. Hamil had violated the Stanfords' rights to enjoyment of their
property.5 °
In Smith v. GeorgiaKaolin Co. ," John Smith filed a petition to quiet
title under O.C.G.A. sections 23-3-60 to 23-3-72 with regard to land
located in Wilkinson County, Georgia. 2 The heirs of George Cobb (the
"Heirs") intervened, and Georgia Kaolin Co. and Dry Branch Kaolin Co.
also claimed an interest in the property. After discovery, the two kaolin
companies moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because neither Smith nor the
Heirs "had demonstrated ownership by instruments of title or prescription, while Dry Branch had been in possession of the disputed property
since the petition was filed." 3 The trial court granted the kaolin
43. 264 Ga. at 801-02, 449 S.E.2d at 119.
44. Id. at 801, 449 S.E.2d at 119.
45. Id. at 802,449 S.E.2d at 119 (citing Safeway Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 194 Ga. App. 160,
390 S.E.2d 52 (1989)).
46. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 120.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. Further, because the supreme court concluded that the Stanfords were not
"plaintiffs" entitled to judgment on their counterclaim, the award for attorney fees against
Ms. Hamil was reversed. Id. at 802-03, 449 S.E.2d at 120 (citing Betallic, Inc. v.
Deavours, 263 Ga. 796, 439 S.E.2d 643 (1994)).
51, 264 Ga. 755, 449 S.E.2d 85 (1994).
52. Id. at 755, 449 S.E.2d at 86.
53. Id.
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Smith and the Heirs

1

Before considering the merits of the appeal brought by Smith and the
Heirs, the Georgia Supreme Court first commented on the purpose and
interpretation of the Quiet Title Act of 1966"5 (the "Act")." The Act's
stated purpose is to "'create a procedure for removing any cloud upon the
title to land, . . . and for readily and conclusively establishing that
certain named persons are the owners of all interest in land . . .. 5"

The court also noted that, in addition to creating an alternative for other
actions used to determine the status of title to real property, the Act
relaxed the standards imposed upon plaintiffs bringing such actions."8
Specifically, the Act eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff prove
actual possession of the disputed property. However, the court
concluded that in order to "withstand a motion to dismiss, a person must
assert a claim of either current record title or current prescriptive title"
to the disputed property.59
The court turned to the merits of this case and concluded that Smith
demonstrated "by written instruments that disputed issues of material
fact remain[ed] concerning his claim" under the Act notwithstanding his
apparent failure to establish his possession of the property.6' However,
the court found that the Heirs had shown no claim of title to the
disputed property.6" Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment against Smith and affirmed the entry of
judgment against the Heirs.6 2 The decision in this case points out the
difference in the prima facie elements between actions filed under prior
law concerning the establishment of title to realty and those brought
under the Act. Parties not in possession of the property at issue (like
landlords) should be sure that their actions are based on the Act,
thereby avoiding an elemental defect in their pleadings.

54. Id.

55. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 (1982).
56.

264 Ga. at 755, 449 S.E.2d at 86.

57. Id. at 756, 449 S.E.2d at 86 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citingIn re Riverrnist Homeowners Ass'n, 244 Ga. 515,518,260 S.E.2d 897,899
(1979)).
60. Id. at 757, 449 S.E.2d at 87.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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3 settled a dispute between the
The court in Giddens v. Barrentine,"
Town of Enigma ("Enigma") and local property owners which arose out
of an abandonment of a railroad right-of-way. In 1986, the Interstate
Commerce Commission authorized CSX Transportation to abandon its
railroad line in Berrien County. A portion of that railroad line ran
through Enigma. The railroad executed a quit claim deed in favor of
Enigma in 1989 which purported to grant to Enigma a portion of the
railroad's right-of-way.6 4
In 1992, owners of property adjacent to the railroad's right-of-way filed
suit against Enigma's Mayor and City Council members seeking a writ
of ejectment, quiet title, and an injunction. The property owners based
their claim on their status as successors-in-title to John Easters. In
1870, Easters had conveyed to the railroad's predecessor "'the right and
title to run and build their railroad lot of land number 369. '"65 The
addendum clause in Mr. Easters' deed granted title to the railroad
company "so long as they their successors and assigns shall maintain
and use said road but to revert to the said party of the first party
whenever the said road shall be abandoned."66 The trial court granted
owners and against
summary judgment in favor of the adjacent property
67
the town of Enigma, and Enigma appealed.
The supreme court stated that the deed from Mr. Easters to the
railroad's predecessor "indicates that the parties intended to establish
a railroad right-of-way, either as an easement or a determinable fee." 8
Under either interpretation of the deed, the court concluded that the
adjacent property owners held superior title to Enigma." First, if the
deed conveyed an easement, "the railroad company had no interest to
convey to the town after abandoning its property in 1986. "70 On the
other hand, if the deed conveyed a determinable fee, then "title to the
right-of-way vested in the adjoining property owners" when the railroad
abandoned the property in 1986.71 Therefore, the court reversed the

63. 264 Ga. 510, 448 S.E.2d 441 (1994). Another case involving the abaondonment of
a railroad right-of-way was discussed in last year's survey. See T. Daniel Brannen, et. al.,
Real Property, 46 MERCER L. REV. 401, 422-24 (1994) (discussing Bridges v. City of
Moultrie, 210 Ga. App. 697, 437 S.E.2d 368 (1993)).

64.
65.
66.
67.

264 Ga. at 510-11, 448 S.E.2d at 442.
Id. at 511, 448 S.E.2d at 442.
Id. The fact pattern in Giddens is a fairly common one in right-of-way disputes.
Id.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 511-12, 448 S.E.2d at 443.
70. Id.
71. Id. There were actually two sets of property owners contesting Enigma's right to
the property at issue-the owners of land in Land Lot 369 and the owners of land in Land
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grant of summary judgment in favor of the property owners in Land Lot
370 and remanded for trial.72 The decision in this case provides
another example of the Georgia courts' literal interpretation of real
property conveyance documents and serves as a warning to real estate
attorneys of the importance of careful drafting.
The decision reached by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Chicago 7Ttle
Ins. Co. v. Investguard, Ltd,"3 resolved an issue of first impression in
Georgia law relating to title to property. In 1988, Jack Jennings
("Jennings") purchased a tract of land with money borrowed from
Investguard, Ltd. ("Investguard"). Jennings granted Investguard a deed
to secure debt securing repayment of the loan. In connection with that
transaction, Chicago Title Insurance Company ("Chicago Title") issued
a title insurance policy in favor of Investguard. The policy insured
against encumbrances on the property, defective title, lack of right of
access, and unmarketability of title. 4
Eventually, Jennings defaulted on his repayment obligations to
Investguard, and Investguard foreclosed on the property. Later,
Investguard discovered that portions of the property were located in a
flood plain and that the property apparently lacked access to a public
road. Thereafter, Investguard made a claim against Chicago Title under
the title insurance policy. Chicago Title denied that it had any liability
to Investguard under the terms of the policy and commenced an action
seeking a declaration that the property had access to a public road and
that the flood plain condition was not covered under the policy.
Investguard counterclaimed against Chicago Title for breach of the
insurance contract and for bad faith refusal to pay.7" Chicago Title
filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted that
motion as it related to the access issue, but denied the motion as it
related to the flood plain issue. The trial court concluded that a genuine
issue of fact remained concerning the marketability of the property due
to its location in a flood plain. Both parties appealed.76

Lot 370. The court's opinion contained no discussion with regard to the merits of the

dispute between Enigma and the owners of land in Land Lot 370. However, at the end of
its opinion, the court noted that "[bloth the property owners and the town agreed that
there remain issues that the trial court must resolve related to the property in Land Lot
370." Id. at 512, 448 S.E.2d at 443.
72. Id. at 512, 448 S.E.2d at 443.
73. 215 Ga. App. 121, 449 S.E.2d 681 (1994).
74. Id. at 121, 449 S.E.2d at 682.
75. Id. Investguard also brought an action against the lawyers involved in the loan
transaction for legal malpractice. Jerry B. Marshall and his law firm were named by
Investguard as counterclaim defendants. Id.
76. Id. at 122, 449 S.E.2d at 682.
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The appellate court stated in its opinion that no Georgia court had
previously addressed the issue of whether the fact that property is
located in a flood plain renders title to that property unmarketable. 7
In order to decide the case, the court looked to decisions rendered in
similar situations by courts in other jurisdictions. The court of appeals
noted that those courts have found that "defects in the physical condition
of... property ...

do not constitute unmarketability of title."7"

The

court of appeals adopted the reasoning of other courts and stated that
"[allthough location of part of the property in a flood plain my affect its
market value, it does not affect the marketability of title to the
property."79 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
decision and found that Chicago Title was entitled to entry of judgment
as a matter of law."0
The court of appeals also sided with Chicago Title on the issue of
access to the property."' The property at issue in this case was
separated from a*public road by two other tracts that were formerly
owned by Jennings. The deed for the first of the two tracts (the "Second
Tract") described the property being conveyed by reference to a compiled
plat."2 That plat "showed two parallel lines beginning from the
northern edge of the [Slecond [Tiract and extended across both that tract
and the third tract into the subject property."' The plat also bore the
designation "R/W" and contained a scale for determining dimensions
depicted on the plat." The deed out from Jennings with regard to the
third tract "contained a reservation of a 60-foot-wide easement."85 The
court concluded that those notations, coupled with the existence and
contents of the referenced plat, established access to the property as a
matter of law." Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision granting summary judgment to Chicago Title with
regard to the issue of access to the property.87
77. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 682-83.
78. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 683 (citing Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Kumar, 506 N.E.2d 154
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987); Title Trust Co. v. Barrows, 381 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. App. 1979);
Hocking v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 234 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1951); Sperling v. Title Guar. & Trust
Co., 227 A.D. 5 (N.Y. 1929), affd, 170 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1930)).
79. Id. at 123, 449 S.E.2d at 683.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 124, 449 S.E.2d at 683-84.
82. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 683.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id., 449 S.E.2d at 683-84.
87. Id. at 125, 449 S.E.2d at 684. Marshall and his law firm had filed a motion for
summary judgment at trial on the same bases as those asserted by Chicago Title and had
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In Thomas v. Garrett," an elderly woman ("Ms. Thomas") unsuccessfully attempted to have a deed she executed in favor of her niece set
aside.89 In the underlying transaction, defendants agreed to give Ms.
Thomas three elements of consideration for the transfer of land-50,300
in cash, $675 per month for the rest of her life, and the right to remain
on the land in defendants' care during her life."° However, because the
defendants planned to borrow $50,300 from a lending institution, the
sales contract was drafted to reflect that element as the sole consideration for the conveyance.91 The sale of the property took place under
those terms. Ms. Thomas's right to continuing payments and to live on
the property after the conveyance were reflected in a separate postclosing agreement which was formally executed by Ms. Thomas and
defendants.9 2
The parties performed under the postclosing agreement for several
months before Ms. Thomas moved off of the property. Thereafter,
defendants continued to make payments as required under the
postclosing agreement: Ms. Thomas filed an action against defendants
seeking to cancel her deed to them.93 She based her right to cancel the
deed on the provisions of O.C.G.A. section 23-2-2, which allows the
cancellation of deeds where there exists a "'[gireat inadequacy of
consideration, joined with great disparity of mental ability.'"'
Ms.
Thomas also sought to set aside the deed based on defendants' exercise
of undue influence over her. The trial court directed the verdict against
Ms. Thomas on her claim under O.C.G.A. section 23-2-2. The trial court
also directed a verdict in favor of defendants on Ms. Thomas's claim that
the deed should be set aside based on defendants' exertion of undue
influence over her.9'

achieved similar results. Both Marshall and Investguard had appealed the trial court's
decision, and those appeals proceeded at the same time as Chicago Title's appeal. Id. at
122, 449 S.E.2d at 682. The court of appeals found that its decision concerning the flood
plain and access issues with regard to Chicago Title controlled the issues on appeal for
Marshall and his law firm. Id. at 125, 449 S.E.2d at 684. Therefore, the court of appeals
found that Marshall and his law firm were entitled to summary judgment against
Investguard on its claims for breach of contract and malpractice. Id.
88. 265 Ga. 395, 456 S.E.2d 573 (1995).
89. Id. at 397-98, 456 S.E.2d at 575-76.
90. Id. at 395, 456 S.E.2d at 574.
91. Id. at 395-96, 456 S.E.2d at 574.
92. Id. at 396, 456 S.E.2d at 574.
93. Id. at 396-97, 456 S.E.2d at 575.
94. Id.at 397, 456 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-2 (1982)).
95. Id.at 395, 456 S.E.2d at 574.
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects." First, with regard to Ms. Thomas's claim that the deed should
be cancelled based on defendants' undue influence, the court found that
"there was no evidence that the deed has been executed by [Ms. Thomas]
as a result of any undue influence exercised by [defendants]."97 The
court found that there was no evidence to support Ms. Thomas's
argument that defendants were in a confidential relationship with her
or that they had controlled her finances."8
Next, the court determined that Ms. Thomas had failed to establish
either of the two elements required to set aside a deed under O.C.G.A.
section 23-2-2. That code section permits a deed to be cancelled if there
is a "'[gireat inadequacy of consideration, joined with great disparity of
mental ability.'"9" The court stated that the evidence showed "that the
fair market value of the farm greatly exceeded $50,300. " "'° However,
the court further noted that the cash consideration Ms. Thomas received
for her conveyance of the land was not the sole consideration for the
contract. Under the post-closing agreement, she also received an
enforceable promise by the defendants to make $675 per month
payments and care. 101 Additionally, the court noted that plaintiff
executed an affidavit at the closing of defendants' purchase of the land
"acknowledging that she was conveying her farm for less than its fair
market value and she was doing so because of her 'natural love and
affection' for [defendants]." 102 Based on those facts, the court concluded that3 Ms. Thomas had failed to show a great inadequacy of consideration. 10

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 398, 456 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. at 397, 456 S.E.2d at 575.
Id.
Id., 456 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 23-2-2).
Id. at 398, 456 S.E.2d at 576.
Id. In the first part of its opinion, the court addressed Ms. Thomas's argument

that the postclosing agreement should not have been considered at trial. The court
concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that there was no present consideration flowing

from Ms. Thomas for defendants' execution of that agreement, the agreement was
enforceable based on the parties' performance. In any event, Ms. Thomas could not avoid
the effect of the agreement based on her own failure to provide consideration, and, as noted
by the court, defendants were not seeking to avoid the agreement. Id. at 396-97, 456
S.E.2d at 575.
102. Id. at 398, 456 S.E.2d at 576. The court noted that "love and affection" may
constitute valid consideration. Id. (citing Cannon v. Williams, 194 Ga. App. 808, 22 S.E.2d
838 (1942)). However, given the court's findings regarding the adequacy of other

consideration, the issue of "love and affection" was not central to the court's decision.
103. Id.
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The court also concluded that Ms. Thomas had failed to establish her
claim regarding a disparity of mental ability between her and defendants. In that regard, the court found that while there was opinion
evidence that a recent surgery and plaintiff's continuing medication
could have had an effect on her mental capacity, "the actual witnesses
to [plaintiff's] execution of the deed had no doubts as to her mental
capacity."11 4 Further, Ms. Thomas's personal physician examined her
the day after the closing of the sale and found no indication of any
mental incapacity. The court concluded that the evidence "was such as
to demand a finding that [plaintiff] had sufficient mental capacity to
execute the deed."10 5
III.

LANDLORD/TENANT AND DISPOSSESSION

There were several cases decided during the survey period in the law
relating to the landlord-tenant which presented either interesting or
important principles of law. First, in Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Center
Developers, Inc.,"° the court of appeals clarified the law concerning the
enforceability of contractual waivers of subrogation agreements
contained in leases.0 7 The entire argument concerning such waiver
provisions related to their interplay with O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b).
That code section provides that an agreement relating to a building (e.g.,
a lease) that purports to indemnify or hold a party harmless against
liability for damages arising out of damage to property caused by or
resulting from the sole negligence of that party, its agents, or its
employees is void and unenforceable as against public policy.0"
Southern Trust Insuranceinvolved appeals of decisions reached in nine
different cases, all of which arose out of two fires which occurred at
Loehmann's Plaza Shopping Center (the "Shopping Center") in Smyrna,
Georgia. Plaintiffs in all nine cases were either tenants at the Shopping
Center, owners of such tenants, or insurers of the tenants claiming
under a right of subrogation. Defendants in the cases included the
owner of the Shopping Center, the property management company of the
Shopping Center, and the contractors responsible for maintaining the
neon signs which allegedly caused the fires. 1"

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 217 Ga. App. 215, 456 S.E.2d 608 (1995).

107. Id. That issue was discussed in last year's survey. See T. Daniel Brannen, et. al.,
Real Property, 46 MERCER L. REV. 401, 417-20 (1994) (discussing Central Warehouse &
Dev. Corp. v. Nostalgia, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 15, 435 S.E.2d 230 (1993)).
108. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (1982 & Supp. 1995).
109. 217 Ga. App. at 215-16, 456 S.E.2d at 609.
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After the close of discovery, the Shopping Center owner and its general
partner moved for summary judgment on the basis of provisions
contained in the various leases, in which the tenants purportedly waived
any rights of parties claiming through them based on subrogation. The
trial court granted those motions, and various plaintiffs appealed.'
The nine leases at issue in Southern Trust Insurance each contained
one of three different waiver of subrogation clauses. Six of the leases
contained the following waiver of subrogation provision:
Each of the parties hereto waives any and all rights of recovery against
the other ... for loss of or damage to such waiving party or its

property or the property of others under its control arising from any
cause insured against under the standard form of fire insurance policy
with all permissible extensions and endorsements covering additional
perils or under any other policy of insurance carried by such waiving
party in lieu thereof."'
Appellants in those six appeals argued that their leases did not "'bar
subrogation because none of the leases required the tenants to purchase
first-party property insurance."' 2
In making that argument, those appellants relied on the decision
rendered in Central Warehouse & Development Corp. v. Nostalgia,
Inc."' The court of appeals rejected that argument and found that
issues raised by these six appellants were controlled adversely to them
by the recent whole court opinion in Glazer v. Crescent Wallcoverings,
Inc.H4

In Glazer the court of appeals expressly disapproved language
contained in Central Warehouse & Development Corp. which suggested
110. Id. at 216, 456 S.E.2d at 609.
111. Id. at 217, 456 S.E.2d at 610.
112. Id.
113. 210 Ga. App. 15, 435 S.E.2d 230 (1993). In Central Warehouse Development, the
court of appeals held that, absent a lease provision obligating a tenant to purchase and
maintain fire insurance, an exculpatory provision purporting to relieve the landlord from
liability for damages arising from its sole negligence is unenforceable. Id. at 17,435 S.E.2d
at 232.
114. 217 Ga. App. at 217, 456 S.E.2d at 610 (citing Glazer v. Crescent Wallcoverings,
Inc., 215 Ga. App. 492, 493, 451 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1994)). The principal for which the court
in Southern Trust Insurance cited Glazer was not the primary holding in that case. 215
Ga. App. 492, 451 S.E.2d 509 (1994). In Glazer, the tenant and landlord had agreed in a
lease not to sue one another for negligence. The tenant suffered damage and sued third
parties (not the landlord) for their part in causing those damages, and those third parties
filed contribution actions against the landlord. The main issue before the court on appeal
was whether the waiver of subrogation provision between the tenant and the landlord
prevented the third parties from maintaining their contribution claims against the
landlord. 215 Ga. App. at 494, 451 S.E.2d at 512.
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"that an intent to shift the risk to the insurer could be expressed only by
a separate mandatory insurance provision.""' The court noted that
the language in the six leases at issue in Southern Trust Insurance was
"substantially identical" to the waiver of subrogation provision at issue
in Glazer."6 The court also noted that the waiver provisions at issue
were clearly labeled as "waiver of subrogation clauses," clearly contemplated the existence of insurance, and "'by their terms do not apply in the
absence of insurance.'""' For that reason, the court of appeals concluded that the waiver of subrogation provisions at issue in this case did
not violate the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(b) and found that
the trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendants,"' s
The text of the second waiver of subrogation provision at issue in
Southern Trust Insurance is as follows:
Landlord and Tenant agree that in the event the Demised Premises or
its contents are damaged or destroyed by fire or any other cause
recoverable by insurance maintained by either, the rights of either
against the other with respect to such damage or destruction are
hereby waived and released. 9
Plaintiff subject to that waiver of subrogation provision argued that 1it
20
did not prevent claims for losses beyond those covered by insurance.
The court agreed with plaintiff in Southern Trust Insurance and found
121
that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was unauthorized.

115. 217 Ga. App. at 218, 456 S.E.2d at 610.
116. Id. at 217, 456 S.E.2d at 610.
117. Id. at 218, 456 S.E.2d at 610 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. Judge Smith dissented to the majority opinion with regard to these six leases.
Id. at 223-25, 456 S.E.2d at 613-15 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith noted that each
of the six leases at issue had a "loss and damage" clause as well as a waiver of subrogation
provision. In those provisions, the tenant agreed to hold the landlord harmless "from
liability based on claims of the tenant for damage to the tenant's property, including
subrogation claims by the tenant's insurancecarrier,'unless such damage shall be caused
by the willful act or gross neglect of the landlord.'" Id. at 224,456 S.E.2d at 614 (emphasis
in original). That contractual language, according to Judge Smith, created a question of
fact regarding whether the damages claimed were the results of "gross neglect." Id. Judge
Smith also noted that the "loss and damage" provisions in certain leases had been
amended, and that those amendments also created issues of fact for determination by the
jury. Id. at 225, 465 S.E.2d at 615.
119. Id. at 219, 456 S.E.2d at 611.
120. Id. This plaintiff was actually the parent corporation of a tenant whose property
was destroyed.
121, Id. at 219-20, 456 S.E.2d at 611. Although the court did not expressly state the
basis for its finding, the language in the lease "recoverable by insurance maintained by
either [Landlord or Tenant]" likely was central to the courts' decision. That phrase
indicates that the waiver was only effective to the extent of insurance coverage. See id. at
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The court noted that the record on appeal was insufficient for the court
maintained by defendants covered
to determine whether the insurance
122
the losses to plaintiffs' property.
The final two leases at issue contained the following waiver of
subrogation provision:
Landlord shall not be liable to Tenant or any other person for any
damage ... to ... property by reason of the failure of Landlord to

perform any of its covenants or agreements hereunder, nor for such
damage ... caused by reason of any defect in the Premises now or in

the future existing, nor for any damage... caused by any present or
future defect in the plumbing, wiring, or piping in any part of the
Shopping Center ....

or for any damage arising from acts or negli-

gence of other tenants or occupants of the Shopping Center. 2

The tenant agreed to indemnify and hold the shopping center harmless
from any losses "by reason of any damage... to property .. .,."" The
tenant also agreed that it would, "at its expense, provide and maintain
in force during the entire lease term public liability insurance with
limits of coverage not less than fifty thousand dollars for property
damage loss from any one accident .. . .""' The trial court, reading
the tenant's obligation to provide insurance in connection with the agreement to indemnify and to hold the owner of the shopping center
harmless, concluded that the parties had mutually released each other
and that the tenant had waived any rights of subrogation.12
On appeal, plaintiffs, insurance companies of tenants claiming through
subrogation, argued that the trial court failed to recognize "'the
distinction between coverage under a liability policy and coverage under
a property insurance policy."" 27 The court of appeals agreed. The
court noted liability insurance policies and property insurance policies
insure against different types of risk. 2 The court stated that the
tenant's agreement to maintain "public liability insurance" was intended
to protect the landlord from "the 'noncontractual legal liability' claims of
invitees or other third parties."1

29

The court concluded that such an

219-20, 456 S.E.2d at 611.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 220, 456 S.E.2d at 612.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 220-21, 456 S.E.2d at 612 (discussing the different risks insured against
under the two types of policies).
129. Id. at 221, 456 S.E.2d at 612.
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agreement was "not evidence that the landlord and tenant have agreed
to exculpate each other and to look solely to insurance in the event of
casualty to personal property ... .,"o Therefore, the court of appeals
held that summary judgment was improperly granted against the
insurers for their131claims based on fire damage and alleged consequential
business losses.

The lesson to be learned from the holding in Southern Trust Insurance
is that landlords and tenants alike must carefully review any lease
provision that purports to shift the risk of loss between the parties.
Practitioners representing landlords would be well advised to model any
lease-based waiver of subrogation provision on the provision found
enforceable in this case.
In Mullis v. Shaheen,"2 Billy Mullis, Bruce Love, and Love Enterprises, Inc. ("Lessees") entered into a five-year commercial lease with
Doris B. Shaheen.'33 The lessees operated a business from the leased
property and made monthly payments as required in the lease until the
business was sold. The new owner of the business did not execute a new
business. Thereafter, the tenant
lease with Shaheen after the sale of the134
defaulted on its obligation to pay rent.
The landlord filed suit seeking a writ of possession for the premises,
a judgment for past due rent, and a judgment for rent that became due
after the landlord regained possession during the remainder of the lease
term. The trial court granted summary judgment against Mullis and
Love in the principal135 amount of $37,500 plus attorney fees and
postjudgment interest.

Mullis appealed, arguing that the landlord was not entitled to recover
rents that became due after she obtained a writ of possession and
terminated the lease. The court of appeals rejected that argument,
noting that while eviction of a tenant normally extinguishes the
landlord's right to recover rent, Georgia law allows parties to a contract
to agree differently.'36 The court of appeals noted the long-established
rule in Georgia, "'Parties to a lease agreement may contract in advance
to hold the lessee liable for rent even after an eviction, deducting
therefrom only the amounts recovered by the lessor from reletting the

130.
include
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. In fact, the opposite is probably true; tenants often work quite diligently to
a carefully worded casualty provision in any lease.
Id.
217 Ga. App. 277, 456 S.E.2d 764 (1995).
Id. at 277, 456 S.E.2d at 765.
Id. at 277-78, 456 S.E.2d at 765.
Id. at 277, 456 S.E.2d at 765.
Id. at 278, 456 S.E.2d at 765.
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premises."'137 The court found the lessees clearly agreed to such an
arrangement in this case, and the landlord was entitled to entry of
judgment as a matter of law based on the plain language of the
agreement.,3 8
The decision in Market Place Shopping Center v. Basic Business
Alternatives, Inc. 3 ' involved the effect of a landlord's violation of a
lease provision which granted a tenant the exclusive right to operate a
certain type of business on a property and identifies the measure of
damages a tenant may recover upon such a breach. Basic Business
Alternatives, Inc. d/b/a New Garden Bake Shop and Deli ("New Garden")
signed a lease with Market Place Shopping Center (the "Owner") for the
operation of a bakery and a deli. 4 ° The lease contained a provision in
which the Shopping Center agreed not to rent space to another bakery
or deli without New Garden's permission. Shortly after New Garden
opened for business, the Owner secured Gorin's Gyro Wrap ("Gorin's")
as a tenant in the Shopping Center. Gorin's menu included "specialty
deli sandwiches.""' Gorin's opened for business in March 1992, and
from that time until New Garden ceased operating in June 1992, New
Garden's sales declined sharply.""
New Garden filed an action against the Owner for breach of the
exclusivity provision contained in the lease and sought a declaration that
New Garden had no further obligations under the lease. The Owner
filed a counterclaim seeking possession of the premises and the balance
of the rent due under the lease. 43 The trial court, sitting as the trier
of fact, concluded that the Owner violated the exclusivity provision by
leasing space to Gorin's and entered judgment in favor of New Garden.
The trial court also awarded the Owner rents which became due under
the lease prior to April 1992. The Owner appealed. 44
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling in part and
reversed it in part. 4 As a preliminary matter, the appellate court
agreed that, by leasing to Gorin's, the Owner violated the exclusivity

137. Id. (quoting Bentley-Kessinger, Inc. v. Jones, 186 Ga. App. 466,467-68,367 S.E.2d
317, 318 (1988)).
138. Id.
139. 213 Ga, App. 722, 445 S.E.2d 824 (1994).
140. Id. at 722, 445 S.E.2d at 825.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. Although it is not clear from the court's opinion, the Owner's claim likely
included claims for rents due both before New Garden closed (in June 1992) and due
thereafter until the end of the lease term.
144. Id. at 722-23, 445 S.E.2d at 826.
145. Id.
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provision contained in the lease. The court of appeals interpreted the
term "deli" according to its "usual and common signification." 146 The
court found that a deli is "'a store where ready-to-eat food products [are]
sold either to be taken out or eaten on the premises, as in sandwiches.'' 147 The court of appeals also agreed that New Garden had established a sufficient connection between the Owner's breach of the lease
and New Garden's inability to pay rent. Therefore, the court concluded
space to Gorin's excused New Gardens
that the Owner's leasing of 148
lease.
the
under
performance
On the other hand, the court of appeals reversed the award of
damages to New Garden, finding that the trial court had applied an
incorrect measure of those damages.1 49 The court, quoting the decision
reached in Carusos v. Briarcliff, Inc.,"o stated that the appropriate
measure of New Garden's damages was "'the difference in value between
the plaintiffs leasehold with the covenant against competition unbroken
and the same leasehold with the covenant broken.""" In this case,
New Garden only produced evidence of its investment in preparing the
leased premises for use as a bakery and deli (i.e., the cost to build-out
and equip the space, and the cost of obtaining supplies), but failed to
produce any evidence regarding the diminution of the value of its
leasehold.'5 2 Absent evidence of that kind, the court of appeals
concluded that New Garden was not entitled to an award of damages. 153
IV.

SALES CONTRACTS AND BROKERS

In Bowers v. Greene, 54 the court of appeals held that a jury would
have to decide whether a sales broker was entitled to a commission
when facts exist to show the owner prevented the broker from completing the sale of real property.'55 In early 1987, James Bowers and
William Humphlett (the "Brokers") learned that the United States Postal

146. Id.
147. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 (1982)). The court noted that the definition of "deli"
was drawn from a dictionary but did not indicate the exact source of that definition. Id.
at 722, 445 S.E.2d at 826 (the trial court consulted a dictionary in defining the term).
148. Id. at 723, 445 S.E.2d at 826 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-4-23 (1982 & Supp. 1995)).
149. Id.
150. 76 Ga. App. 346, 45 S.E.2d 802 (1947).
151. 213 Ga. App. at 723,445 S.E.2d at 826 (quoting Carusos v. Briarcliff, Inc., 76 Ga.
App. 346, 351, 45 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1947)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 217 Ga. App. 468, 458 S.E.2d 150 (1995).
155. Id. at 470-71, 458 S.E.2d at 152.
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Service (the "Postal Service") was interested in purchasing certain
property located in eastern Cobb County. The Brokers contacted the
owners of the property, Darryl Greene, Paul 0. Owenby and Al Hallman,
Jr. (the "Owners") concerning the possibility of a sale of their property
to the Postal Service. The Owners and the Brokers entered into a listing
agreement on February 19, 1987 which provided in part that Brokers
would offer the property for sale to the Postal Service at $130,000 per
acre and that if sale were consummated the Brokers would receive a ten
percent commission. The listing agreement did not contain a termination date.'56
The initial negotiations between the Brokers and the Postal Service
did not produce a contract for sale of the property. After approximately
eight months, the Postal Service notified the Brokers that its purchase
of the property was being put "on hold." 5 ' Thereafter, the Owners
instructed the Brokers to cease their contact with the Postal Service and
informed them that the Owners' attorney would handle all future
negotiations." 8
In December 1990, the Postal Service contacted the Owners directly,
and the Owners executed an offer to sell the property to the Postal
Service for $110,000 per acre. The Brokers did not help negotiate that
offer and did not learn about it until Spring 1991. After learning of the
offer, the Brokers contacted Mr. Greene who told them "to do whatever
[they] 'could to facilitate the sale.'"' 59 During a meeting with the
Brokers, Mr. Greene stated that "they 'had certainly done [their] duty
and... that the real estate fee was due... ,' but that they need[ed] to
contact
Owenby."16 Owenby told the Brokers that no commission was
61
due.'

The Postal Service purchased the property on October 11, 1991, and
the Brokers were not paid a commission. The Brokers sued the Owners
for breach of contract and quantum meruit. The trial court granted the
Owners' motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim,
but denied that motion with regard to the quantum meruit claim, and
both parties appealed.'62

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 468-69, 458 S.E,2d at 151.
Id. at 469, 458 S.E.2d at 151.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 469-70,458 S.E.2d at 151.
Id. at 470, 458 S.E.2d at 151.
Id., 458 S.E.2d at 152.
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The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order granting judgment
against the Brokers' contract claim.' 63 The court stated that because
the Brokers were not the exclusive agent of the Owners in connection
with the sale of the property, the Brokers
were entitled to recover ... commissions ... only upon proof that they

were the procuring cause of the [sale], which can be established by
showing that negotiations for the sale were set on foot through their
efforts, that they performed every service required by their employment
which it was possible to perform, and that the failure on their part to
personally consummate the trade was due to the interference of the
[Owners].""
Construing the evidence most strongly against the Owners, the court
concluded that three issues of fact remained to be decided by the jury:
(1) Whether the sale to the Postal Service was consummated without
further assistance from the Brokers as a result of the Owners' interference; (2) Whether the Brokers would have ultimately consummated the
sale to the Postal Service but for the Owners' interference; and (3)
Whether the sale was consummated within the reasonable time implied
in the listing agreement between the Owners and the Brokers.165
However, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court's finding on
the Owners' motion for summary judgment against the Brokers' claim
for quantum meruit.'66 The record before the trial court supported a
finding that the Owners engaged the Brokers to sell the property, that
the Brokers informed the Postal Service that the property was available,
that the Brokers submitted an offer to sell the property on behalf of the
Owners, that the Brokers negotiated terms with the Postal Service and
continuously met with Postal Service representatives concerning the
surveying, appraisal, and rezoning of the property, and that the Owners
accepted those services.' 67 Under those circumstances, the jury must
be "'allowed to decide' whether
[the Brokers are] entitled to any recovery
68
in quantum meruit."

163. Id. at 470-71, 458 S.E.2d at 152.
164. Id. at 470, 458 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting Realty World & Co. v. Hooper Properties,
191 Ga. App. 773, 775, 383 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1989)).
165. Id. at 470-71, 458 S.E.2d at 152-53.

166. Id. at 471-72, 458 S.E.2d at 153.
167. Id. at 471, 458 S.E.2d at 153.
168. Id. (quoting Futch v. Guthrie, 176 Ga. App. 672, 673, 337 S.E. 384, 385 (1985)).
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FORECLOSURES

The court in Mobley v. Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Co.t 69
analyzed the interplay between the private mortgage insurance policies
that are often required by lenders in connection with loans secured by
real estate and O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161 relating to confirmation of
foreclosure sales.17 In that case, the appellants ("Mobley") borrowed
$59,000 from a lender to purchase real property. In connection with the
loan, the lender required that Mobley obtain a private mortgage
insurance policy which "provided that in the event of default, [the
insurer] would pay the lender thirty percent of the appellants' outstanding debt at the time of default, irrespective of any amount bid at the
foreclosure sale."17' Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Company
("Commonwealth") issued the insurance policy (the "Policy") according
to those terms. The Policy required Mobley to indemnify Commonwealth
for any sum that Commonwealth had to pay the lender under the
insurance policy. 72
Mobley defaulted on the loan, and the lender foreclosed and purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale. Without attempting to confirm the
foreclosure sale, the lender made a claim against Commonwealth under
the mortgage insurance policy. Commonwealth paid the lender $19,303
under the policy and then sought to recover that sum from Mobley
pursuant to the indemnity provided in the Policy. Mobley defended that
action, claiming that its indemnity agreement with Commonwealth was
void as against public policy in that it sought to circumvent the
requirements of O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161.171 Mobley also asserted
a third-party complaint against the lender for equitable subrogation.
Mobley asserted the lender was unjustly enriched by obtaining both the
property and the proceeds of the mortgage insurance policy. The trial
court granted Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment and
denied Mobley's motion for summary judgment on their third-party
claims. 74 The court of appeals affirmed that ruling in an unpublished

169. 264 Ga. 652, 450 S.E.2d 205 (1994).
170. Id. at 652, 450 S.E.2d at 205. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (1982).
171. 264 Ga. at 652, 450 S.E.2d at 205.
172. Id.
173, Id. at 653, 450 S.E.2d at 206. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 provides that "no action may
be taken to obtain a deficiency judgment unless the person instituting the foreclosure
proceedings shall, within 30 days after the sale, report the sale to the judge of the superior
court of the county in which the land is located for confirmation and approval and shall
obtain an order of confirmation and approval thereon." O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a).
174. 264 Ga. at 653, 450 S.E.2d at 206.
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opinion, stating that the holding in Turner v. Commonwealth Mortgage
Assurance Co. controlled the appeal.'
The supreme court granted a
writ of certiorari in order to decide the issues involved.17 6
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals decision and held
that Commonwealth's suit against Mobley did not violate the statute
requiring confirmation of foreclosure sales before a deficiency judgment
may be sought. 77' The court found that Mobley's liability to Commonwealth under the policy's indemnification provision arose independently
of the debt Mobley owed to the lender and therefore did not constitute
a "deficiency."17 In reaching that decision, the court noted that the
confirmation statute was in derogation of common law and that its
language must be strictly construed. 9 Additionally, because the court
found no evidence of any relationship between the lender and Commonwealth, there was no basis for the court to conclude that the issuance of
the Policy "'constituted a deliberate subterfuge of the confirmation
statute.' 18 0
Judges Benham and Hunstein dissented from the majority's decision
in this case.1 8' In their dissent, Judges Benham and Hunstein stated
that the loan transaction and the issuance of the Policy were "inextricably intertwined."'8 2 Because of the close relationship between the two
transactions, the dissenters believed that "public policy required that
such an agreement not be enforced unless their compliance with the
confirmation of sale statute and that indemnification would be limited
to the actual loss suffered as a result of the foreclosure.""
The
dissenters concluded that the lender's requirement of mortgage
insurance was simply another method of attempting to avoid the
statutorily created judicial review of actions seeking deficiency judgments, and that the "scheme is, therefore, violative of the clear public
policy of this state."8 4
The decision the court reached in Mobley may have a significant
impact on the practice relating to real estate lending and foreclosures.
Lenders will likely begin increasingly to require private mortgage

175. Id. (citing Turner v. Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Co., 207 Ga. App. 428,
428 S.E.2d 398, 398 (1993)).
176. See id. at 654, 450 S.E.2d at 207.
177. Id. at 653, 450 S.E.2d at 206.
178. Id. at 654, 450 S.E.2d at 207.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Turner, 207 Ga. App. 428, 430, 428 S.E. 398, 430).
181. Id. at 654-57, 450 S.E.2d at 206-08 (Benham, P.J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 657, 450 S.E.2d at 208.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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insurance as a condition of lending and will look to those policies to
satisfy any loss that they incur as a result of a foreclosure. Of course,
insurers may challenge lenders' rights to recover under such policies
where the foreclosure sale price is inexplicably low.
During the survey period, both the Georgia Supreme Court and the
court of appeals rendered decisions in a case in which a debtor sought
to set aside a foreclosure based on the lack of the statutorily required
notice. " Those decisions are important because they clarify the relief
that may be afforded debtors who fail to receive such notice and clarify
several evidentiary issues that arise in many such disputes.
In Calhoun First National Bank v. Dickens,"s Rebecca Dickens and
her husband executed a promissory note and security deed in favor of
Calhoun First National Bank (the "Bank") in connection with the
Dickens' purchase of certain real property." 7 Thereafter, Mr. Dickens
transferred his interest in the property to Ms. Dickens. When Ms.
Dickens defaulted on her obligations under the promissory note, the
Bank sent notice of default as required by O.C.G.A. section 44-14-162 to
Mr. Dickens, but not to Ms. Dickens." 8 The Bank subsequently sold
the property at foreclosure.
Ms. Dickens brought an action seeking an accounting and damages
based on a wrongful foreclosure on the ground that she did not receive
the statutorily required notice of default. At trial, Ms. Dickens made a
motion for directed verdict, which the trial court denied. At the close of
the trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Bank. Ms. Dickens
appealed. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment,
finding that the foreclosure sale should have been set aside based on Ms.
Dickens' lack of notice of the foreclosure and sale.18 9 Additionally, the
court of appeals held that Ms. Dickens was entitled to a directed verdict
for damages equal to the amount by which the fair market value of the
property exceeded the indebtedness at the time of the sale."'

185. See Calhoun First Nat Bank v. Dickens, 264 Ga. 285, 443 S.E.2d 837 (1994);
Dickens v. Calhoun First Nat'l Bank, 214 Ga. App. 490, 448 S.E.2d 237 (1994). Those two
reported decisions were not the only times this case appeared before an appellate court.
See 214 Ga. App. at 490, 443 S.E.2d at 837 (citing three previous appearances of the case
before the court of appeals). The facts underlying the case are set forth in detail at 208 Ga.
App. 489, 431 S.E.2d 121 (1993).
186. 264 Ga. 285, 443 S.E.2d 837 (1994).
187. 264 Ga. at 285, 443 S.E.2d at 838.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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The supreme court granted the Bank's petition for writ of certiorari in
order to review the issue of the relief to which Ms. Dickens was
entitled."' The supreme court stated that O.C.G.A. section 23-2-114
allowed a debtor to either seek to set aside a wrongful foreclosure or sue
for damages in tort, but not both. 92 Because Ms. Dickens chose in this
case to pursue an action for tort damages, the supreme court found that
the court of appeals' decision setting aside the foreclosure sale itself was
improper. 93
The supreme court also reversed the court of appeals' finding that Ms.
Dickens was entitled to a directed verdict on her damages claim." 94
The supreme court conceded that Ms. Dickens had established two of the
four elements necessary for her to prevail on her tort claim-i.e., the
existence of a duty and the breach of that duty.195 However, the court
concluded that Ms. Dickens failed to establish that the evidence
demanded entry of judgment as a matter of law based on damage that
proximately resulted from the Bank's failure to provide her notice of the
foreclosure sale. 96 Based on those findings, the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case for consideration
of the enumerations of error previously not considered. 9 7
On remand, the court of appeals addressed two evidentiary issues
which are relevant to this survey. 9 First, during the trial of the case,
Ms. Dickens attempted to admit into evidence two appraisals of the
condemned property made by a now-deceased appraiser, but the trial
court excluded those appraisals as inadmissible hearsay.'99 In an
interesting ruling, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
on that issue, concluding that the appraisals did not fall within the
"business records" exception to the hearsay rule because they contained
the opinion of the appraiser.2"0 Second, Ms. Dickens attempted to
introduce testimony by a neighboring land owner concerning the value
of her property. The court of appeals acknowledged that property
owners generally did not have to be qualified as an expert to state their
191. Id.
192. Id. at 285-86, 443 S.E.2d at 838.
193. Id. at 286, 443 S.E.2d at 838.
194. Id.
195. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 839.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 286-87, 443 S.E.2d at 839. The court of appeals had determined that the
remaining enumerations of error were rendered moot by its reversal of the trial court. The
Supreme Court directed the court of appeals to address those issues on remand. Id. at 287,
443 S.E.2d at 839.
198. 214 Ga. App, 490, 491-92, 448 S.E.2d 237, 238-39 (1994).
199. Id. at 491, 448 S.E.2d at 238.
200. Id.
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opinion as to the value of their own property. "° However, in this case,
the court of appeals stated that Ms. Dickens had failed to establish any
basis for the neighbor's opinion concerning the value of her property."2
Absent such a showing, the court concluded there was no basis for the
neighbor's testimony, and therefore such testimony was inadmissible.2 "3
In Breeze v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co.,2" the court of appeals held
that the provision in the federal bankruptcy code which stays the
running of limitations periods generally also tolls the time within which
a foreclosing creditor is required to report a foreclosure sale for
confirmation. 0 5 Thomas R. Breeze ("Breeze") was a debtor under a
bankruptcy proceeding. Pursuant to an agreement between Breeze and
Columbus Bank & Trust Co. ("CB&T"), CB&T was granted relief from
the automatic stay to conduct a foreclosure of real property in which it
held a security interest. After proper notice and advertisement, a
foreclosure sale was conducted on May 3, 1993, but CB&T did not
immediately report the foreclosure sale to the appropriate superior court
for confirmation. 2" On August 20, 1993, Breeze dismissed his bankruptcy. Thereafter, by letter dated August 31, 1993, CB&T advised the
superior court of the foreclosure sale and applied for confirmation. The
trial court confirmed the sale on March 3, 1994, and Breeze appealed.2 7
The appellate court found that whether the foreclosure was not
reported for confirmation within thirty days of the actual sale as
required by O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161 was "not significant" under the
circumstances of this case. 0 s Under 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), periods of
limitation relating to claims against debtors in bankruptcy are tolled
during the pendency of the bankruptcy and for thirty days thereafter.20 9 The court of appeals stated that the agreement permitting the
201. Id., 448 S.E.2d at 239.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 214 Ga. App. 534, 448 S.E.2d 276 (1994).
205. Id. at 535, 448 S.E.2d at 277.

206. Id. at 534-35, 448 S.E.2d at 277.
207. Id. at 534, 448 S.E.2d at 277.
208. Id. at 535, 448 S.E.2d at 277.
209. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)). The Bankruptcy Code provides in pertient part

that
if applicable non-bankruptcy law... fixes a period for commencing or continuing
a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the
debtor. ... and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the
petition, then such period does not expire until thelater of... 30 days after notice
of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362, 722, 1201, or 1301
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foreclosure sale did not also relieve CB&T from the automatic stay for
purposes of confirming the sale.2" ° Therefore, the court concluded that
the time for reporting the sale to the superior court for confirmation had
been suspended and did not begin to run until thirty days after Breeze's
bankruptcy petition was dismissed."' As a result, the court concluded
that the foreclosure sale was properly and timely reported in accordance
with O.C.G.A. section 44-14-161.212

In Coleman Road Associates v. Culpepper,"3 Coleman Road Associates ("Coleman"), through its general partner, Carl Callum ("Callum"),
executed a promissory note and deed to secure debt in favor of Dorothy
Tanner Culpepper ("Culpepper") in connection with Coleman's purchase
of real property. 14 Coleman defaulted on the note and Culpepper
foreclosed on the property. At the foreclosure sale, Culpepper bid in an
amount sufficient to fully satisfy Coleman's debt under the promissory
note, plus all related expenses. Thereafter, Culpepper filed an action
against Coleman and Callum alleging that Coleman had breached the
obligations contained in the security deed to (i) keep the property in good
condition, (ii) pay taxes on the property, and (iii) keep the property
insured. Coleman and Callum moved for summary judgment. The trial
court denied that motion, and Coleman and Callum appealed.215
The court of appeals found the trial court had erred by failing to grant
Coleman and Callum's motion for summary judgment. 16 As the court
discussed, a security deed only conveys title to the grantee for the
purpose of securing repayment of a debt, and "'upon satisfaction of the
obligation which it is given to secure, [the security deed] is automatically
extinguished in effect.'"2" 7 By bidding an amount at the foreclosure
sale which fully satisfied Coleman's debt to her, Culpepper satisfied the
note to her. As a result, the deed securing the note's repayment was
extinguished. Therefore, the court concluded that Culpepper was

of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim.
11 U.S.C. § 108(c).
210. 214 Ga. App. at 535, 448 S.E.2d at 277.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 214 Ga. App. 475, 448 S.E.2d 83 (1994).
214. Id. at 475, 448 S.E.2d at 84.
215. Id. at 475-76,448 S.E.2d at 84-85. Coleman's and Callum's appeal was made upon
application for an interlocutory review of the trial court's decision. Id. at 475, 448 S.E.2d
at 84.
216. Id. at 476, 448 S.E.2d at 85.
217. Id. at 475, 448 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Sapp v. ABC Credit & Co., 243 Ga. 151, 154,
253 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1979)).
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prohibited from filing an action based on the terms of the extinguished
security deed and reversed the trial court's decision.2 1
VI.

EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONDEMNATION

The court in Georgia Neurosurgical Clinic, P.C. Profit Sharing Plan
v. Rockdale County,"' held that valuations by an expert witness of
other properties similar to the property being condemned may be a
proper subject for cross examination of that witness.22 In the case, in
connection with a reservoir project, Rockdale County (the "County") filed
a condemnation petition to acquire title to nearly one hundred acres of
property and to a buffer easement in nearly nine acres of property
within a single tract owned by Georgia Neurosurgical Clinic P.C. Profit
Sharing Plan (the "Plan").2 2' A special master entered an award of
$309,030 in favor of the Plan, but the Plan appealed that award. After
a trial in which the jury awarded $292,211, the Plan appealed, asserting
that the trial court had erroneously excluded certain evidence from
consideration.222
Among other things, the Plan argued that the trial court erred in
refusing to allow questioning of the County's expert appraiser concerning
his appraisals of other similar property, as well as questions concerning
general trends which could have affected the value of the condemned
property. 2 3 During the trial, the Plan sought to cross examine the
County's appraiser concerning the value of other property which adjoined
the condemned property and which the County also sought to acquire." That adjacent property contained wetlands which the County
purchased in order to mitigate the loss of wetlands expected to be
destroyed by the reservoir project. There was evidence in the record that
the County's appraiser assigned a per-acre value for the adjacent
property that "was approximately twice as high as the value placed on
the subject acreage by the jury."225 On the other hand, the County's
appraiser had testified with regard to the property being condemned

218. Id. at 476, 448 S.E.2d at 85. Coleman and Callum also argued that Culpepper's
lawsuit was "an attempt to obtain a deficiency judgment that is barred by her failure to

have the foreclosure sale confirmed." Id. The court of appeals did not address that issue
since it found on the grounds discussed above that Culpepper's claim was improper. Id.
219.

216 Ga. App. 32, 453 S.E.2d 88 (1994).

220. Id. at 34, 453 S.E.2d at 91.
221.

Id. at 32, 453 S.E.2d at 89.

222. Id.
223. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 89-90.

224. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 89.
225. Id.
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that the presence of wetlands on the subject tract "was a significant
factor detrimental to its value."22
The County argued that the testimony the Plan sought to elicit by
questioning the appraiser was inadmissible. It has long been recognized
in Georgia that "sales of land to condemning authorities are inadmissible
as evidence in condemnation proceedings on the issue of the value of the
land sought to be condemned."22 7 That general rule is based on the
belief that such sales do not represent a true value of the property as
"neither party is necessarily free from compulsion."2 2 The court of
appeals concluded that the holding from Jordan was not applicable in
this case because the testimony did not relate to the sales price of the
adjoining property; rather, the testimony related to the County's
appraiser's valuation of property similar to that being condemned.229
That testimony would be relevant to the value of the condemned
property in that it could demonstrate that the appraiser had employed
inconsistent appraisal methods or had arrived at inconsistent opinions
regarding the value of similar property.23
During the trial, the Plan also sought to question the County's
appraiser concerning his knowledge of recently enacted federal
legislation requiring the replacement of destroyed wetlands and whether
that legislation had any effect on the value of the condemned property
in this case. 3s Essentially, the property owner argued that the federal
requirements enhanced, rather than lessened, the value of the condemned property because that property contained wetlands which would
need to be replaced. The court concluded that the Plan's proposed
questioning related to the central issue in the case, namely the value of
the condemned property. 2 ' Therefore, the trial court should have
allowed the questions. 3 3
The current appeal in White v. Fulton County 4 is the second
appearance of this case before the Georgia Supreme Court.23 The case
arises out of the condemnation of land for the College Park MARTA Rail
226.

Id.

227. Id. (citing Jordan v. Department of Transp., 178 Ga. App. 133, 134, 342 S.E.2d
482, 483 (1986)).
228. Id. at 33, 453 S.E.2d at 89.

229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 90.
Id.

233. Id. There were several other evidentiary questions raised by the Plan on appeal.
However, those issues are relatively minor and do not warrant discussion here. See id.,
453 S.E.2d at 90-91.
234. 264 Ga. 393, 444 S.E.2d 734 (1994).
235. Id. See Fulton County v. Dangerfield, 260 Ga. 665, 398 S.E.2d 14 (1990).
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Station and, like many recent, significant condemnation cases, involved
36
claims by both the owner and lessee of the condemned property."
The Dangerfields were the owners of the property prior to condemnation,
and White was a lessee of that property. In the earlier appeal, Fulton
County had appealed a jury award to White and the Dangerfields and
was successful in having the jury award overturned. When the case was
called for retrial, White moved to dismiss the claims against him,
arguing that the issues concerning the value of his leasehold interest in
the property had been resolved by the jury in the first trial and that the
supreme court's reversal of the jury award had no effect on the judgment
for White. The trial court granted White's motion and Fulton County
appealed.237
The court of appeals stated in its opinion that "'the jury's task was to
determine first the value of the whole property, and then the proportionate amounts of that whole value to be awarded to the separate interests.' 2 3 In essence, the court of appeals held the total award that
may be made to an owner and lessee of condemned property cannot
exceed the fair market value of that property. The court of appeals
relied on the holding in Department of Transportation v. Olshan,3 9 a
Georgia Supreme Court decision, as authority for its holding.240 Based
on the holding in Qishan, the court of appeals concluded that the
erroneous admission of testimony concerning the value of the Dangerfields' ownership interest in the subject property necessarily affected the
jury verdict with regard to the value of White's leasehold interest. 1
Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the trial court and remanded
the case with regard to White for trial along with the retrial of the
Dangerfields' claim.242
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeals' ruling, stating
that "the aggregate value of White's leasehold and Dangerfields'
ownership interest is not limited to the fair market value of the subject
property."24 The Georgia rule on this issue "is that where there are
separate estates to be condemned, each owner is entitled to the full

236. 264 Ga. at 393, 444 S.E.2d at 734.
237. Id.

238. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 734-35 (quoting Fulton County v. Dangerfield, 209 Ga. App. 298,
300, 433 S.E.2d 335, 336 (1993)).
239. 237 Ga. 213, 227 S.E.2d 349 (1976)

240. Id. at 394, 444 S.E.2d at 735 (citing Department of Transp. v. Olshan, 237 Ga.
213, 217, 227 S.E.2d 349, 352 (1976)).

241. Id.
242. Id. at 395, 444 S.E.2d at 735. See 209 Ga. App. 298, 300, 433 S.E.2d 335, 336
(1993), cert. granted.

243. 264 Ga. at 395, 444 S.E.2d at 735.
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value of his respective interest, even though the aggregate amount thus
2 44
attained may exceed the value of the property appraised as a unit."
The court noted that the contrary principle, followed by the court of
appeals "is referred to as the 'undivided fee rule,' and is adhered to in
some jurisdictions."245 The supreme court distinguished Olshan on its
facts from those presented in White because Olshan did not involve the
condemnation of a leasehold interest in addition to the fee interest.246
Further, to the extent cases previously decided by the court of appeals
had relied upon Qlshan and applied the "undivided fee" rule, the court
expressly overruled those cases.247 The supreme court reversed the
court of appeals judgment and remanded the case to that court for
consideration of whether the error in the first appeal affected the
judgment entered in White. 48
The appeal in Department of Transportation v. Sharpe,249 arose out

of the condemnation by the Department of Transportation ("DOT") of
19.289 acres of land located in Houston County which contained
approximately eight million tons of limestone deposits. 20 The evidence
presented at the jury trial showed that Sharpe was not mining the
limestone at the time of the condemnation and had refused to sell the
mining rights to a cement company operating on the tract located next
to the property being condemned. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Sharpe and awarded $650,000 as the value of the property, including
the limestone deposits. The DOT appealed assertingthe court had erred
by giving an incorrect jury instruction and by failing to declare a
mistrial after hearsay evidence concerning the value of the property was
introduced.5 1
The court of appeals in Sharpe reversed the trial court's decision on
the basis of the trial court's jury instruction relating to the "0i6euliar
value of [the] property."25 2 The jury charge at issue was as follows:
You are entitled to consider the peculiar value of property to the owner
under certain conditions, but before you consider the peculiar value of

244. Id. at 393-94, 444 S.E.2d at 734 (quoting 1 GEORGE S. PiNDAR, GEORGIA REAL
ESTATE LAW & PROCEDURE § 2-44 (4th ed. 1993)).

245. Id. at 394 n.1, 444 S.E.2d at 735 n.1 (citation omitted).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 394, 444 S.E.2d at 735 (overruling Department of Transp. v. McClaughlin,
163 Ga. App. 1, 2,292 S.E.2d 435,437 (1982) and Department of Transp. v. Franco's Pizza,
200 Ga. App. 723, 725, 409 S.E.2d 281, 283 (1991)).
248. Id. at 395, 444 S.E.2d at 735.
249. 213 Ga. App. 549, 445 S.E.2d 343 (1994).
250. Id. at 549, 445 S.E.2d at 344.
251. Id. at 550-51, 445 S.E.2d at 344-45.
252. Id. at 550, 445 S.E.2d at 344.
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the property to the owner, you must find that the relationship of the
owner to it is peculiar, that is-that its advantages to the owner are
less exclusive, and would not be likely to apply to another
more or
253
owner.
Generally, the measure of damages in a condemnation case is the "fair
However, "when the
market value" of the condemned property.2
evidence shows that the property has some unique and special value to
the condemnee other than, or over and above, fair market value, and
that fair market value will not afford just and adequate compensation
to the condemnee, other criteria than fair market value may be
considered."25
Before a jury may consider an alleged "peculiar value" of condemned
property in Georgia, the owner of the property must be devoting it to a
use which relates to that peculiar value at the time of the condemnation.256 The court of appeals found no evidence in the record to
support a conclusion that Sharpe had any special relationship to the
land "or that adequate compensation could not be determined by fair
market value."2 57 Specifically, the court found no evidence that the
land was being used at the time of condemnation for any peculiar purpose. 2 8 The court concluded, even though the jury charge on peculiar
value contained an accurate statement of the law, no evidence existed
supporting that charge. Therefore, giving that charge was "presumptively harmful" to the DOT and required reversal of the jury's verdict. 2 59
The DOT also argued that the trial court erred in allowing Glen
Sharpe to testify that he thought the condemned land and limestone
deposits were worth over eight million dollars. Prior to trial, the trial
court had granted the DOT's motion in limine and declared that Sharpe
was not an expert witness entitled to state his opinion of value based on
Notwithstanding that ruling, Mr. Sharpe did
hearsay evidence.'
testify regarding his opinion of the value of the land. The DOT moved
for a mistrial, but that motion was denied. Instead, the court gave a

253.
254.
255.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Macon-Bibb County Water & Auth. v. Reynolds, 165 Ga. App. 348,

352, 299 S.E.2d 594, 597 (1983)).
256. Id.
257.

Id.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 551, 445 S.E.2d at 345.
260. Id. Mr. Sharpe was expected to testify concerning a conversation he had with an
official of a cement company in which that official stated his company was paying one
dollar per ton for limestone. Id.
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curative instruction to the jury.261 The court of appeals held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in choosing to give a curative
instruction as opposed to granting a mistrial and agreed that curative
instruction "adequately addressed any harm attributable to Sharpe's
testimony."262 However, based on its finding with regard to the
erroneous jury instruction, the court of appeals reversed the jury verdict
entered in favor of Sharpe.26 s
The holding in Sharpe is instructive of two things: 1) The court
approved a jury instruction on "peculiar value;" and 2) The court
indicated clearly the circumstances under which such an instruction is
proper.264 Practitioners seeking to argue that their clients' property
has peculiar value should take heed of the result in this case where a
court erroneously instructed on the law relating to that issue.
In Back v. City of Warner Robbins, ss the City of Warner Robbins
(the "City") filed declarations of taking to condemn property for a
roadway construction project. 266 The City utilized the procedure set
forth in O.C.G.A. section 32-3-4 to condemn the property.167 After a
trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the City granting the
declaration of taking. On appeal, the condemnees raised two main
issues: (1) that the City was not entitled to utilize the procedure set
forth in O.C.G.A. section 32-3-4 because the title to the condemned
property was not in dispute; and (2) that the City abused its discretion
in failing to consider alternative roadway plans which would have been
less burdensome 26for
taxpayers as well as for the owners of the con6
demned property.

261, Id.
262. Id. at 552, 445 S.E.2d at 345.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. 217 Ga. App. 326, 457 S.E.2d 582 (1995).
266. Id. at 326, 457 S.E.2d at 583.
267. Id. at 327,457 S.E.2d at 583. Actions to condemn property brought under § 32-3-4
must comply with very specific procedures. See O.C.G.A. §§ 32-3-5, -6, and -7 (1982)
(stating specific contents to be included in condemnation petition, filing of declaration of
taking, and requiring deposit into court of estimated sum of money due as just and
adequate compensation for taking).
268. 217 Ga. App. at 327, 457 S.E.2d at 583. In dicta, the court of appeals mentioned
that the condemnees argued on appeal that the taking was improper "because it will
primarily benefit private businesses in and around a shopping mall." Id. at 328, 457
S.E.2d at 584. The condemnees made that argument despite having not explicitly
identified that as a basis for appeal. Nonetheless, the court of appeals found that there
was "no evidence of improper intent" by the condemning authority to benefit one or a few
private individuals through the condemnation, rather than to benefit the general public.
Id. The court expressly stated that the evidence showed the real purpose of the project was
to relieve traffic congestion and to reduce the number of accidents in the area of the
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In a short opinion, the court of appeals rejected both arguments.269
First, with regard to the first argument, the court noted that O.C.G.A.
section 32-3-4(a) permits a municipality to condemn private property
using the procedures in that code section if the municipality "'shall for
any reason conclude that it is desirable to have a judicial ascertainment
of any question connected with the matter.'"27 ' Based on that statutory
language, the court in Back concluded that municipalities may utilize
O.C.G.A. section 32-3-4 even where the title to the property is not in
question."
With regard to the second argument, the court found
testimony in the trial record to support the trial court's conclusion that
the City had, in fact, considered less burdensome alternatives.2 72
While the court noted that the City's mayor and City Council members
could not remember the exact alternatives considered, there was
testimony in the record from the City's engineers and planners "that the
project was a result of many273years of planning and that numerous
alternatives were considered."

Evans v. State,274 involved a forfeiture of real property ordered
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 16-13-49.275 In Evans, the owners of real
property ("defendants") that was subject to forfeiture raised the defense
that such a forfeiture constituted an "excessive fine" prohibited by the
Georgia and United States Constitutions 6 Police officers in a
helicopter had sighted marijuana growing on defendants' property and
notified officers on the ground of the location of the contraband.7 7 The
officers on the ground approached the defendants' house and saw Danny
Gaddis begin running through the woods toward the reported location
of the marijuana. The police entered the defendants' property and
followed Gaddis. When they located him, he was "pulling marijuana

condemned property. Id.
269. Id. at 327-28, 457 S.E.2d at 583-84.
270. Id. at 327, 457 S.E.2d at 583 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 32-3-4(a) (1982) (emphasis in
original)).
271.

Id.

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. 214 Ga. App. 844, 449 S.E.2d 302 (1994).
275. Id. at 845, 449 S.E.2d at 303. Section 16-13-49 provides for the forfeiture of any
real or personal property "which is, directly or indirectly, used or intended for use in any
manner to facilitate a violation" of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. O.C.G.A. § 1613-49(dX2) (1992 & Supp. 1995). For a case discussing the application of that Code section
to a forfeiture of personal property, see Thorpe v. Georgia, 264 Ga. 712 (1994).
276. 214 Ga. App. at 846, 449 S.E.2d at 303 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VII and GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, para. xvii).
277. Id. at 845, 449 S.E.2d at 303.
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plants from the ground with both hands."2 7' Thereafter, the police
seized twenty-four marijuana plants growing on the land surrounding
the house and ten plants growing inside the house.2 79 The total weight
of the plants the police seized was approximately one-half pound.2"
Based on that evidence, the trial court determined that the defendants'
property "was used to facilitate a violation of the [Act] in the manufacturing of marijuana" and ordered a forfeiture of the property to the State
of Georgia...
On appeal, the appellants argued, among other things, that the
forfeiture of the entire property on the basis of discovery of only 8.8
ounces of marijuana constituted cruel and unusual punishment and an
excessive fine, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and by Article I, Section 1, Paragraph VII of the Georgia
Constitution. Because no Georgia court had previously addressed the
issue, the court of appeals looked to decisions interpreting the federal
criminal forfeiture statute for guidance.28 2 The court found that case
law instructive despite differences
between the Georgia forfeiture statute
28 3
and its federal counterpart.
In a concurring opinion to the decision in Austin v. United States,284
Justice Antonin Scalia "suggested that inquiry [regarding whether a
forfeiture constitutes an excessive fine] focus on 'determining what
property has been "tainted" by unlawful use' rather than the value of the
forfeited property."2
The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with
Justice Scalia finding that "'[tihe question is not how much the
confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has
a close enough relationship to the offense.'" 2 6 The court concluded the
facts of this case supported a finding that the forfeiture of the entire
property did not violate the prohibition against excessive fines under the
Georgia Constitution or the United States Constitution.2 7

278, Id.
279. Id. at 847, 449 S.E.2d at 304.
280. Id.
281. Id.at 845-47, 449 S.E.2d at 303-04.
282. Id. at 846-47, 449 S.E.2d at 304 (citing Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801,
2810 (1993)).
283. Id. at 847 n.1, 449 S.E.2d at 304 n.1.
284. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
285. Id. at 847, 449 S.E.2d at 304 (quoting Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).

286. Id. (emphasis supplied).
287. Id. While the court did not expressly state the basis for its conclusion, it seems
apparent that the presence of marijuana both outside and inside of the house located on
the property was a factor in the decision to uphold confiscation of the entire tract. Those
are the main facts which would indicate that the entire property had been "tainted" by the
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VII. TRESPASS
The court's decision in Garner v.Blair2 explains the burden of
proof in cases where a plaintiff seeks to recover damages based on a
neighboring property owner's failure to provide lateral support. In
Garner,Teresa Blair ("Blair") brought an action against Monroe Garner
("Garner") for damage Blair asserted resulted from Garner's excavation
of dirt from an embankment located on the boundary line between their
adjoining properties."' Garner admitted in response to Blair's interrogatories that he had removed dirt from the embankment at issue.
Blair moved for summary judgment and submitted an unrebutted
affidavit from an engineer who testified that the excavation of that dirt
caused erosion on Blair's property.29° The trial court granted Blair's
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of Garner's liability,
and the case proceeded to trial solely on the issues of damages and
attorney fees. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Blair for $22,500 in damages and $5,000 in attorney fees. Garner filed
a motion for new trial, but that motion was denied and this appeal
followed.291
The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the
issue of liability.292 In light of the unrebutted testimony of Blair's
expert witness and the evidentiary admissions made by Garner during
discovery, the court had no alternative but to find Garner liable under
O.C.G.A. section 44-9-3.293 However, the court agreed with Garner
that the trial court had erred in failing to enter judgment as a matter of
law against Blair on the issue of damages. 2 ' Under Georgia law, "the
measure of damages for injury to real property is the difference in the
value of the property before and after the injury."29 The court found
that there was no evidence in the record on which the jury could have

defendants' illegal activities.
288. 214 Ga. App. 357, 448 S.E.2d 24 (1994).
289. Id. at 357, 448 S.E.2d at 25.
290. Id. Not only was Blair's expert's affidavit unrebutted, it appears that Garner
failed to respond at all to Blair's motion for summary judgment. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 358, 448 S.E.2d at 25.
293. Id. at 357-58, 448 S.E.2d at 25-26. Section 44-9-3 provides that "[oiwners of
adjoining lands owe to each other the lateral support of the soil of each to that of the other
in its natural state." O.C.G.A. § 44-9-3(a) (1982).
294. 214 Ga. App. at 358, 448 S.E.2d at 25.
295. Id. (citing Southeast Consultants v. O'Pry, 199 Ga. App. 125, 126,404 S.E.2d 299,
301 (1991)).
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Blair
based its determination of the damages awarded to Blair.2
failed to produce any evidence of the value of the property prior to the
injury, testifying only as to the price of the property at the time she
purchased it. The court of appeals found that testimony to be insuffiestablish the value of the property immediately prior to the
cient to
297
injury.

VIII.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

There were several minor and one significant legislative changes made
in the law of real property in Georgia during the survey period. Among
the minor changes were the enactment of a notice requirement for
purchasers of property where adjacent property is used for farming or
forestry purposes,2 95 the enactment of a notice that landlords must
provide prospective residential tenants if the leased property has
previously been flooded,29 9 and the enactment of a requirement that
the contractor (not the owner or the owner's agent) file the Notice of
Commencement required in connection with the Mechanics' and
Meterialmen's Lien Act.3"'
The general provisions of Title 44 were amended this year to create a
notice provision in connection with the "purchase, lease, or other
acquisition of real property or any interest in real property located in
any county which has been zoned for agricultural use or identified on an
approved county land use plan as agricultural or silvicultural use."" 1
If an owner knows that the property being sold or leased is located
"within, partially within, or adjacent to" land zoned for agricultural or
forestry uses, the owner must provide the prospective purchaser or lessee
a notice that the use of land for agricultural or forestry purposes may
create some conditions which may cause neighboring landowners
"discomfort and inconvenience" even where the activities being conducted
on the property are in "conformance with existing laws and regulations
and accepted customs and standards."30 2 It may be speculated that the
passage of this statute was prompted by claims of nuisance being
brought against owners of agricultural or forestry land and was an
attempt to short circuit such claims. However, the practical effect of this
296. Id.
297.

Id.

298. See O.C.G.A. § 44-1-17 (Supp. 1995).
299.
300,
301.

See id. § 44-7-20.
See id. § 44-14-361.5(b).
Id. § 44-1-17(a).

302. Id. Interestingly, O.C.G.A. § 44-1-17 also imposes an obligation on the prospective
purchaser or lessee to perform some investigation to determine whether the subject
property is within, partially within, or adjacent to agricultural or forestry land. Id.
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Code section may be fairly limited because the statute, by its terms, does
not affect the validity of deeds delivered and recorded in transactions
was not given and creates no cause of action against
where notice
30 3
violators.
Chapter 7 of Title 44, relating to Landlord/Tenant relationships, was
amended to require that the owner of real property leased for residential
occupancy provide notice to prospective tenants if "flooding" has caused
damage to the leased property or its contents three or more times during
the five preceding years.3" "Flooding" is defined as "the inundation
of a portion of the living space covered by the lease which was caused by
an increased water level in an established water source such as a river,
stream, or drainage ditch." 0 Unlike the change to section 44-1-17
discussed above, this amendment has some teeth. A landlord who fails
to comply with the notice requirements relating to flooding is liable in
tort for damage which may be caused by subsequent flooding of the
leased premises. 0 '
The most significant legislative development in the law of real
property during the survey period was the amendment of the Georgia
Land Sales Act (the "State Act").30 7 Under the prior version of the
State Act, unless they were involved in sales exempt from the Act,
subdivision developers were required to file with the Georgia Real Estate
Commission (the "Commission") a registration statement containing
certain disclosures relating to the land being developed and sold. 0 ,
The Commission issued a "certification of compliance" to developers
complying with the provisions of the State Act. If a subdivision
development was registered under the State Act, the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") deemed that
the plan met the requirements of the Federal Interstate Land Sales Full
and HUD issued a certificate of
Disclosure Act (the "Federal Act")
30 9
compliance with the Federal

Act.

In the 1995 amendments to the State Act, the Georgia legislature
eliminated the possibility that subdivision developers could file their

303.

Id. § 44-1-17(b), Wd.

304. Id. § 44-7-20.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. §§ 44-3-1 to -233 (1992 & Supp. 1995). The Georgia Land Sales Act is the state
law counterpart to the federal Interstate Land Full Disclosure Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701
to 1720 (1988).
308. See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-3, -4 (1991 & Supp. 1995). Section 44-3-4 sets forth the
categories of transactions that were exempt from the requirements of the Georgia Land
Sales Act. Id. § 44-3-4.
309. 15 U.S.C. § 1708.
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registration statements with the Commission. 1 ' Under the amended
law, subdivision developers who are not involved in exempt transactions
are only required to provide prospective purchasers with a "property
report" which contains disclosures about the developer and the subdivision.311 In effect, the legislature has eliminated the registration of
subdivisions in Georgia. While that amendment at first glance seems
beneficial to subdivision developers (i.e., savings in time and money
through reduction in regulation), it does create some problems. First, if
the transaction is one that was required to be registered in Georgia
under the old version of the State Act, it will most likely be a transaction that must be registered under the Federal Act.3" 2 Therefore, the
elimination of the state registration requirement will likely not save
subdivision developers any significant trouble or money through the
"reduced" regulation.
The second and most significant problem created by the amendment
is one that affects subdivisions that were previously registered under the
State Act, but which will become "de-registered" under the amendment.
Compliance with the registration requirements under both the State and
Federal Acts is (or was) usually not just a one-time procedure. Most
large subdivisions are developed in stages, and the individual stages
often would have to be registered separately, or the initial registration
of the subdivision updated, to reflect the additional subdivided lots being
offered for sale. Now that the Commission will no longer be accepting
updates to previously filed registration statements, those updates will
have to be filed directly with HUD. However, the practical problem is
that HUD does not have the original statements and any updates the
subdivision developer has filed previously. Additionally, the elimination
of registration under the State Act will result in the revocation of HUD
certificates of compliance. According to the notice published by HUD,
those certificates expired November 14, 1995.3"3 In order to obtain a

310. See O.C.G.A. § 44-3-3(a) (1991 & Supp. 1995).

Prior to the most recent

amendment, the subsection (a) of the Georgia Land Sales Act stated as follows: "It shall
be unlawful for any person to offer for sale or to sell any subdivided land to any person in
this state unless such land is subject to an effective registrationstatement under this article
or such land is exempt under Code Section 44-3-4." O.C.G.A. § 44-3-3(a).
311. The amended section 44-3-3 states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to offer to sell or to sell any subdivided land
to any person in this state unless such offering complies with this article or is
exempt under Code Section 44-3-4. Any person offering to sell any subdivided
land shall provide each prospective purchasera property report containing the

following ....
O.C.G.A. § 44-3-3(aX1).
312. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1704 with O.C.G.A. § 44-3-4.
313. See 60 Fed. Reg. 42,436 (1995).
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HUD certificate of compliance thereafter, developers of subdivisions will
be forced to essentially recreate their earlier filings with the Commission
and to go through the entire registration process all over again,
duplicating the expenses involved in that process.

